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Modern industry and commerce have brought radical changes to the
mechanism of contract. Legislators and lawyers to a great extent still
look upon a contract as a bargain which emanates from negotiations
between two individuals who are trying to influence the final result
in accordance with their interests. The fact is, however, that the bulk
of the contracts in a modern community are made without very much
negotiation. One party-the customer-is free to choose the type of
thing or benefit he wants, but the other party usually dictates the other
conditions. This tendency has given rise to special legislation in all
civilized countries to establish the general contractual pattern which
a certain industry should apply, often by means of mandatory rules.
In most fields, however, there is still left a considerable degree of
freedom, not a freedom to negotiate and frame individual contract
terms, but a freedom for the stronger party to insist on his general
terms. These terms will invariably form the basis for the legal relations
between the industry and the public and will obtain much the same
character as statutory law. Just as public authorities administer public
law in their dealings with citizens, the great firms and industries administer their standard contract forms. Given the enormous number
of individual decisions that have to be made, legal proceedings will
be the rare exceptions in private business as well as in public administration. The executive officer of a big company basing its commerce
on standard contracts therefore will, like the public administrator,
distribute benefits and impose liabilities in accordance with legal texts,
and the persons with whom he deals will more often than not have
little legal knowledge and little insight in this particular area of
administration or business.
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No more than his colleague in public administration will the executive officer of a big private company attempt to twist the wording of
the text to the benefit of the party he is representing. Deviations from
the strictly legal solutions will tend to go the other way; there is
ample proof that the executive officer will be under strong pressure,
induced partially by competition, to grant the customer greater benefits and impose upon him fewer liabilities than he might have done if
he had adhered strictly to the texts. This tendency is probably found
in private business more often than in public matters, where financial
and other controls will be more rigid. In the Scandinavian languages
this tendency to deviate from standard contract forms to the benefit
of the individual customer is called kulanse. Although English apparently lacks a corresponding word, "gratuitous deviation" or "inclination
to pay ex gratia" would probably come nearest to the meaning. The
phenomenon is a knowing abstention from enforcing the rights which
a contract gives a party, rather than a settlement of a dispute about
interpretation of ambiguous terms in the contract.
The problem concerns all industries which deal with the public at
large and which avail themselves of standard contract forms. These
conditions are characteristic of the life insurance business, which is the
focus of this article. There are three situations in which a life insurance company has a right to contest a claim but where its acting officers may be tempted to pay ex gratia.The first occurs when the applicant has concealed material facts or has given misleading information
regarding his health. The second situation arises when the applicant
has not paid the premium on time. The third occurs when the person
on whose life the insurance is taken out has died before the company's
risk attached. This third situation is the object of our attention.1
1 In the first of these situations, the stipulations of the insurance contract will usually
be of little importance. The duty of the applicant to give full and correct information

and the position of the insurer when there is a breach of this duty are important parts
of the general background law. The law varies somewhat from one country to another,
and there are particularly differences as to whether a concealment or misrepresentation
has to be substantial and material and whether the insurer may contest the policy when
the applicant has made his misleading statements in good faith. When, as is the prevailing rule, there is a good claim unless the applicant may be personally blamed for having
made a misrepresentation which is material from the insurer's point of view, there is
reason to believe that the insurance companies make use of the possibilities offered by the
background law. There is probably no inclination to be generous towards an applicant
who has shown carelessness or forgetfulness in ascertaining or stating the facts, and the
survivors will generally be held responsible for the faults committed by the deceased. It
may be that the companies do not insist on specified warranties with the same perseverance, especially when there is no suspicion of fraud or carelessness. Such tendencies
cannot, however, be studied in the Scandinavian countries, where warranties are mainly
prohibited. See HELLNIM, EXCLUSIONS OF RISK AND Drrms IMPOsED ON THE INSURED (1955).
Nor does the second situation call for special attention. Forfeiture clauses are standard
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There are several stages in the conclusion of a contract for life insurance: the company's agent comes to see the prospective applicant;
the applicant fills in the application blank; the medical examiner-if
necessary-states his observations; the application is scrutinized and
accepted by the company; the policy is issued; the policy and a request
to pay the first premium are sent to the applicant; the first premium is
paid. Somewhere in the course of this process the insurer will be contractually bound in the sense that he will have a duty to issue the
policy and assume the risk for which the parties have negotiated. And
somewhere in the course of the process the risk will attach.
The first question-whether the insurer is bound by the contract or
not-must be decided in accordance with the general law of contract,
irrespective of whether the parties know these rules or have them in
mind. The exact moment when the insurer assumes the risk, however,
is a basic provision in the contract itself. Unless otherwise provided by
statute, the parties may make any stipulation they want in this respect.
The insurer may assume the risk retroactively or only from some future
moment.
The clauses bearing upon the attachment of risk vary greatly.2 A
provisions in all insurance policies. A person who does not pay what he owes in due
time is by definition at fault. Public interests are protected by statutory requirements
that the insurer must give written notice when the premium falls due or that the insured should be granted certain delays. Probably life insurers abstain occasionally from
invoking forfeiture clauses which they have a legal right to invoke as, for example,
when payment was prevented by circumstances clearly beyond the control of the insured.
This, however, does not interfere with the basic contractual mechanism, nor does it
entail consequences that may be questionable from a general point of view.
2 Most American life insurance policies provide that the risk does not attach until the
home office has approved the application and until the policy is delivered to the applicant. See Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, in Conference on Insurance 1,
20 (University of Chicago Law School Conference Series, Nov. 14, 1954). But some American companies also use binding receipts that provide some coverage immediately upon
application for life insurance: "When the first premium is paid by the applicant with
or at the time of the application for life insurance, he is ordinarily given a receipt, the
form of which falls into one of two general categories. The first, called the 'approval'
form, purports to put the insurance in force immediately, but on condition that the
application be approved at the company's home office on the plan, at the rate, and for
the amount applied for. With the other, the 'insurability' type, the condition precedent
to immediate coverage is insurability of the proposed insured under the rules and practices
of the company on the date of the receipt or the medical examination, whichever is later,
at the rate, on the plan, and for the amount applied for." O'Neill, Interim Coverage:
Conditional Receipts, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 571, 574-75. Courts in almost all American
jurisdictions have upheld such clauses when they were clearly phrased in understandable
language and have held there was no interim coverage unless the condition precedent was
fulfilled. When the clauses are ambiguous, most courts would resolve the ambiguity against
the insurer. Id. at 590-91. See generally, APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
pRAcTIcE §§ 101-12, 131-43, 171-75 (rev. ed. 1965); MACLEAN, Lir' INSURANCE 569 (1962);
Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 ILL. L. REv. 180 (1938); Kessler, supra at
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clause frequently inserted in Norwegian life insurance contracts runs:
"The insurance shall be operative as soon as the policy has been issued
and the stipulated premium has been paid, provided that the insured
person is alive at this moment." But a number of companies waive the
cash payment condition in contracts for the so-called level premium
insurance. In this situation, therefore, the basic condition is that the
insured must be alive when the company issues the policy; if he dies
before the issuance of the policy, the company has no legal obligation
to pay his beneficiaries. Swedish companies usually make no provisions
concerning the attachment of the risk, but instead rely on a statute
which provides that the risk shall attach when the company sends its
acceptance of the application.3 Danish and Finnish conditions are variations of the Swedish rule. In Denmark the insurance usually runs from
noon on the day when the company decides to accept the insurance
and confirms its decision in writing upon the application, whereas the
liability of the Finnish company will start twelve hours later-from
midnight on the day of acceptance.
There are good reasons why the company should not bear the risk
until the application has been scrutinized and the insurance has been
accepted by a competent person in the company's central organization.
The insurer cannot leave it to the life insurance agents to judge the
health of the applicants and accept the risk on behalf of the insurer,
for an apparently innocent disorder may be a symptom of a serious
disease which will either make insurance impossible or necessitate surplus premiums and extraordinary arrangements by way of reinsurance.
It is of vital importance to the insurer that the risk be judged-in
advance of assumption of risk-by a medically trained person so that
the company has a chance to seek supplementary information, to arrange a medical survey, and to decline the acceptance of uninsurable
risks. A contractual mechanism which did not give these opportunities
to the life insurance companies would be intolerable.
Despite the existence of a specific provision calling for delayed acceptance of risk and despite the valid commercial reasons for this provision, Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish insurance companies have not
19-21; Wilkinson, Binding Receipts-Three Decades Later, in AmERICAN LIFE CONVENTION:
LaGAL SECTION 18 (1949); Comment, Life Insurance Receipts: The Mystery of the NonBinding Binder, 63 YALE LJ. 523 (1954); Comment, Operation of Binding Receipts in Life
Insurance, 44 YALE L.. 1223 (1935).
3 Swedish Insurance Contracts Act § 11. This section states that the risk shall run from
the moment when one party sends his acceptance of the other party's offer. The application for insurance is regarded as the offer; the company's acceptance of the application
as the acceptance. Failing proof to the contrary, the letter of acceptance shall be deemed
to have been sent at noon.
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insisted on enforcing this provision and have paid the sum applied
for when the applicant dies in the critical period before risk has been
formally accepted. 4 In Norway5 and Sweden a condition for payment
is establishment beyond doubt that the contract would have been concluded with the premium offered and the sum applied for. Danish
insurers, on the other hand, make ex gratia payments based on guesses
about the results of further negotiations. If, for instance, the answers
in the application blank are of such a nature that the company would
have charged a surplus premium, the company will pay the amount
that might be insured at the premium offered by the applicant.
This generous practice is upheld by strong notions of fairness and
equity within the life insurance industries. In Norway, the question
of an ex gratia payment of N. kr. 400,000 ($60,000) to the relatives of
a man who perished in the mountains while his application was being
processed by the insurer was submitted to a board consisting of eight
managing directors of important life insurance companies. The board
unanimously held that "it would be in conformity with good standards
in Norwegian life insurance to regard this insurance as being operative when the applicant disappeared." 6 And a Swedish life insurance
executive has recommended that "the question of payment in similar
cases ought to be resolved according to equitable principles"; he even
intimates that one may take into consideration such circumstances as
the economic position of the dependents and their need of support.7
Motivations of this more social character, however, play a comparatively modest role in the practice of the companies. The ex gratia payments are mainly used in order to repair the general injustice which
in certain situations is inherent in the prevailing conditions of the
contracts.
4 XIV NoPnisKs
LIVSFORSIKR1NGSKONGRE I KOBENHAVN (1964) [REPORTS, 14TH SCANDINAVIAN, CONGRESS OF LIFE INSURANCE IN COPENHAGEN (1964)]. This contains results of a survey

of the practices of Scandinavian life insurance companies in 1963-1964. In Finland, ex
gratia payments are apparently not made.
5 Norwegian companies use two devices which largely -eliminate the need for ex gratia
payments. According to the conditions of the contracts of two of the thirteen Norwegian
companies, the insurance is deemed to have taken effect immediately upon the signing of
the application and the simultaneous payment of the first premium, provided that the
applicant is later found to have been an insurable risk at this time. Id. at 33. The other
device, which has been developed recently and which has been adopted by most companies, consists in the sale of "provisional policies." The agents sell, against cash payment,
a policy covering for a period of two months death by accident or sudden illness; this
will usually be enough time to accomplish the investigations and formalities. Id. at 34-35.
None of these methods, however, gives a full and perfect remedy, and hence there will
still be some situations where an ex gratia payment is the only way to obtain the result
which is considered fair.
6 Id. at 44.
7 Id. at 63, 65.
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The reasons for these ex gratia payments are several. In almost all
cases everything that happens from the time the application is signed
until the time the risk is accepted is a mere formality. The applications and hence risks which are accepted without medical examination
of the applicant have steadily increased as a means of rationalizing the
company's procedures. The great majority of the applicants are insurable on the usual terms. In fact, rarely will the medical officer of the
company question the health of an applicant and recommend refusal
of the insurance or supplementary inquiries. Thus, in those cases
where the insured would have had his insurance had he not died before the formalities were completed the contractual mechanism seems
unfair and unwise. The survivors may also point to public social insurance where coverage automatically exists from the moment when ohe
takes a job or enters a group where such cover is compulsory; here
even formal application is unnecessary. Why, they may ask, does life
insurance, which undoubtedly may be seen as one of the great social
institutions of our time, avail itself of an antiquated contractual mechanism inherited from a time when a contract was the result of bargaining between two equal partners?
One good reason for making ex gratia payments is the desire to further the company's public relations. An ex gratia payment of some
importance will soon be known in the area of the residence of the recipient and will tend to establish a good reputation for the company.
Being known as a company that treats its beneficiaries "generously"
or as a company that "does not bother with legal niceties" may induce
people to buy their insurance from this particular company. The company's local representative will usually have recommended a liberal
course, and the backing that he gets from his principal will strengthen
his position and attract new customers. When, as is especially the case
in insurance, the companies offer almost identical contract terms, the
choice of local representative is often more important for the prospective client than the choice of company.
Considerations of public relations will also point toward settling the
case out of court if there is the slightest doubt as to the outcome of
legal proceedings. Companies dealing with the public are vulnerable
to criticism, and a lost case means lost prestige. And even if the case
is won, it may strain the company's reputation if the decision rests on
the application of a clause or a rule which the public regards as unfair
or unjust. Thus, even when the legal position is beyond doubt, the
company may be tempted to make payment.
Avoidance of litigation is, of course, also prompted by the desire to
eliminate the costs and risks of litigation. Litigation always costs money
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and occupies the time of people who might have done other and more
useful work. And litigation always creates the possibility of a decision
adverse to the insurer's interest which may return to haunt it in the
future. Even if a decision is based on the circumstances of the particular case, there is the risk it will be relied upon as precedent in similar
cases in the future. Thus, it may be safer to pay the claim today in
8
order to have a freer hand the next time a similar question arises.
A strong element of charity may also be inherent in an ex gratia
payment. The customer as a rule is the little man in society. In life
insurance the surviving relatives may be poor and ill; in casualty insurance a loss may have occurred that will ruin the insured if not compensated. Helping people who are in great need of economic assistance
has given many life insurance executives a feeling that they are representing charitable institutions and has made them especially open to
appeals to charity or generosity. Though commercial motives may be
and often are disguised in the veil of charity, one would do injustice
to the men in life insurance if one categorically denied the element of
spontaneous charity in many of their dispositions.
The practice of ex gratia payments may easily be reconciled with
the principle that one should alleviate poverty or economic need in as
many instances as possible. But there is much poverty in the world,
and the funds of life insurance companies cannot be distributed according to the needs of individuals. The only possible justification of
the ex gratiapayment is that the person almost has a legal claim against
the company, and not that he stands in need of the money, for there
may well be others who are in greater need than himself. If we maintain, however, that life insurance should be paid in accordance with
contractual terms, rather than according to economic need, it is necessary to ask why the people who only came near to having a claim did
not actually get a claim. If it is due to weaknesses inherent in the contractual mechanism itself, defects which the man in the street will re8 There is a possibility that a consistent practice of making ex gratia payments may
alter the law itself by creating a legal duty without any corresponding alteration of the
contracts. Section 34 of the Norwegian Insurance Contracts Act, which is substantially similar to provisions in the Danish and Swedish acts, reads: "When an insurance contract contains a stipulation which is not found in this Statute and which leads to results
which are manifestly unjust and irreconcilable with good insurance practice, such provision shall be set aside." If a Scandinavian company rejects a claim falling clearly within
the generally accepted "ex gratia sphere," the claimant may obtain from other companies
a statement that they would have regarded an ex gratia payment to be appropriate and

in accordance with good standards of life insurance practice. With this industry opinion
the beneficiaries will have a fairly good chance to enforce their claim in the courts. The
fact that there are no reported cases of this kind probably only reflects the stability and
universality of the practice of making ex gratia payments.
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gard as injustices, there is a reason for correcting the situation. But
this means revising the defective mechanism, not exercising individual
charity. If, on the other hand, a person has lost his claim by the application of generally accepted principles of law, there is no apparent
reason why his particular need should be satisfied at the cost of the
company.
Another supposed justification for ex gratiapayments is the difficulty
in framing contracts which in all situations lead to equitable results.
Restrictive terms imply that the company has a legal right to reject
some claims that ought to be honored; liberal terms, on the other hand,
may compel the company to accept claims from persons who are in no
way worthy of protection. By using restrictive terms and adding ex
gratia payments where the contracts fall short, a company may obtain
a maximum of just and equitable decisions. But this argument presupposes that the company is able to reach the "right" and "just" decision
in every situation. This is definitely not so. Life insurance conditions
and other standard contracts are always written so that they can be
easily administered, and hence claims depend on certain simple facts
which are easy to establish. To attempt to reach a "right" or "just"
result requires an examination of the individual circumstances of
every case, a task for which insurance companies are less capable than
the courts.
There is in fact reason to believe that the fair distribution of justice
will be much more difficult under a system of ex gratia payments. A
company choosing this course imposes on itself the burden of being
equally generous towards all its customers. This does not mean that
everyone who is asking for money should get it. But the company must
be consistent; it cannot accept one claim today and reject another claim
tomorrow in situations which are substantially similar. It is of course
not very burdensome to proclaim that one is consistent. But the difficulty is to decide when the facts of a new case are so similar to those
of a preceding one that the outcome ought to be the same. As long as
all decisions are taken in accordance with the contractual terms, it is
fairly easy to be consistent; but once a system of "ex gratia situations"
is created, fair administration becomes considerably more complex.
There is much wisdom in the bureaucrat's unwillingness to deviate
from the letter of the law or the contract, for it protects him against
a situation in which he either will lose control or will be compelled
to do gross injustice to a person who in good faith has relied upon a
liberal practice.
Even if the companies were able to distribute their ex gratia pay-
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ments in a consistent manner, there is reason to believe that their customers would not get equal treatment. In order to achieve complete
equality and fairness, all persons who had a "right" to an ex gratia
payment would have to present their claims. But they probably do not
do so, for the conscientious citizen who has read his contract carefully
will refrain from claiming money which he has obviously no right to
claim. Those who get the payments may thus be the cantankerous and
unscrupulous. This self-selection of claims brought to the company's
attention makes it improbable that full justice will be obtained.
In summary, an extended use of ex gratia payments is unwise. It
places an administrative burden on the insurance companies, and it is
doubtful whether it promotes the high degree of equality and fairness
that is desirable in the relations between life insurance companies and
the public. A stricter application of the contract terms would, of
course, occasionally lead to decisions which might seem hard and bureaucratic. But this might in turn lead to a more frequent revision of
the terms, whereby the public would be given as a right the position
which is intuitively felt to be fair.

